In recent years, the influence of affective states on cognitive processes has received growing attention in both experimental (Bower, 1981; Clark & Isen, 1982) and clinical psychology (Beck, 1976 (Bower, 1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979) .
Moreover, it has also been demonstrated that subjects tend to bias their impressions and evaluations in the direction congruent with their affective tone of their current mood states (Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984) .
This mood congruent effect may be explained in terms of an associative network model, which was proposed by Bower (1981) and more recently amended by Bower (1991 In those studies subjects' affective states were altered by hypnotic suggestions (Forgas et al. 1984) or giving them bogus feedback of a personality test (Forgas & Bower, 1987 Multiple comparisons on the negative mood measure revealed that the self-referent sentence completion tasks elicited significantly more negative affects than did the neutral sentence completion tasks (t=2.764, df=59, p<.05). It also revealed that the other-referent sentence completion tasks elicited more negative affects relative to the neutral sentence completion tasks(t=2.569, df=59, p<.05).
There were, however, no differences between the self-referent and the otherreferent sentence completion tasks. As for the positive mood measure, there was a tendency that the self-referent tasks elicited less positive affects than the neutral ones, though the difference did not reach a statistical significance level. The difference between the other-referent and the control conditions was found to be statistically significant (t=3.148, df=59, p<.01), indicating that the of sentence completion tasks were shown in Table  2 .
One way ANOVA's were administered on the summations of ratings for each scale type. The main effect due to the type of sentence completion tasks was significant for both negative (F(2,84)=9. 958, p <.001) and positive (F(2,84)=5.126, p <.01) relevant scale types, but not significant for either negative (F(2, 84)=1.008, ns) or positive (F(2,84) <1, ns) irrelevant scale type.
Multiple comparisons for negative relevant scale type revealed that subjects who performed other-referent tasks rated the target person as more hostile than did those who performed selfreferent(t=4.335, df=84, p<.001) or control neutral tasks(t=3.175, df=84, p<.01). Subjects who performed self-referent tasks did not rate him any more hostile than did those who participated in neutral tasks. Multiple comparisons for positive relevant scale type showed that subjects not only in the other-referent(t=2.945, df=84, p<.01) but also in the self-referent(t=2.447, df=84, p<.05) task condition rated the target as less friendly than did those in the control condition, whereas there was no significant difference between the otherreferent and the self-referent task conditions. In summary, subjects in the other-referent priming condition rated the target as more hostile and less friendly than in the neutral condition, while subjects in the self-referent priming condition rated him as less friendly but no more hostile relative to the control condition.
As for the case of other-referent priming con- The conclusion, one might draw from the current data, is that negative mood effects on person judgments are not always moderated. The impact of negative moods may be heavily modified under the particular condition when negative moods resulted from the enhanced awareness of negative aspects of self, whereas negative mood effects are not al all weakened when they are derived from the enhanced awareness of negative aspects of others. Thus the present study implies that human cognitive system has a mechanism, as the blackboard model described, for turning down or on activation of emotional nodes, and accommodating its influence on person judgments, depending on the interpretation and evaluation of emotional sources.
Another important implication of the present study is that self-degrading priming procedure may be more likely to cause subjects to use a controlled processing strategy, probably to prevent themselves from psychological disturbances. It is suggested that self esteem might be one of the critical factors in moderating negative mood effects.
Concluding remarks
The present study will contribute toward developing a more refined affect-cognition model in two respects. First, from the theoretical view point, it suggests that we should look at more in detail the way how a mood is being manipulated. The contextual variability in evoking a mood, as well as the valence (positivity or negativity) of a resultant mood, should be a matter of critical importance. Second, from the methodological view point, it has proved that such sentence completion tasks as were used in the present study could be an effective priming device for mood induction. One major advantage of this method is that it enables us to control directly contextual variables in mood manipulation, such as selfreferent or other-referent priming. Another advantage, especially compared with hypnotic technique, is that this method can be applicable for all subjects, both hypnotizable and nonhypnotizable subjects.
Needless to say, further research must be done in a hurry in order to examine whether such kind of moderating rules as was found operating here in case of negative mood will also come to play a significant role in case of positive mood. By continuing this line of research, we will be able to attain a clearer understanding of mood regulation mechanism and a more refined formulation of the links between affect and cognition.
